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REVISITING HEALTH CARE FRAUD IN THE BIDEN
ADMINISTRATION
JOAN H. KRAUSE*
ABSTRACT
Although not one of the Biden administration’s initial priorities, health care
fraud inevitably will be a major concern. First, the federal government’s
response to the COVID-19 pandemic—including the disbursement of more than
$175 billion in provider relief funds and the loosening of traditionally strict rules
on Medicare reimbursement for telehealth services—has created new
opportunities to divert health care funds for fraudulent purposes. Second,
President Joseph Biden took office in the midst of the incomplete transition from
volume-based to value-based payment in the federal health care programs,
which will allow fraud to flourish in the gaps between multiple reimbursement
systems. Third, regardless of these developments, prior forms of fraud are likely
to continue. Thus, the Biden administration will have no choice but to devote
significant resources to fraud enforcement.

* Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor of Law, UNC School of Law; Professor (Secondary
Appointment), Social Medicine, UNC School of Medicine; Adjunct Professor, Health Policy &
Management, Gillings School of Global Public Health. I am grateful for the help of research
assistant Matt Geenen. All errors are mine alone.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Given the crises confronting the United States—from the global COVID-19
pandemic, to the war in Ukraine, to political battles over domestic
infrastructure 1—President Joseph Biden could well be forgiven for not singling
out health care fraud as an initial priority for his administration. After the last
two-and-a-half years, worrying about how federal health care dollars are spent
almost seems like a luxury, or at least an issue that can be addressed through
retrospective audits at some point in the future. Yet fraud is never far from the
health care debate, and for good reason: while emergencies may prioritize the
immediate disbursement of government funds, sooner or later (often sooner),
officials will need to confirm that the funds are being used for their intended
purposes. That pressure to verify proper use of funds is even greater in a time of
fiscal uncertainty, when economic need has risen at the same time as fears of a
pandemic-generated recession. Whenever health care costs are under debate,
fraud concerns are never far behind. 2
Health care fraud inevitably will be a major concern for the Biden
administration for three key reasons. The first is obvious: the COVID-19
pandemic and the government’s response to it. 3 That includes not only the
federal government’s efforts to disburse more than $175 billion in provider relief
funds to hospitals and front-line health care providers to address the economic
pressures of the pandemic, but also the loosening of traditionally strict rules on
Medicare reimbursement for telehealth services. 4 Second, President Biden took
office in the midst of the incomplete transition from volume-based to valuebased payment in the federal health care programs—and one thing we have
learned from experience is that when multiple reimbursement systems coexist,
1. DOJ Announces Coordinated Law Enforcement Action to Combat Health Care Fraud
Related to COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 26, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/doj-an
nounces-coordinated-law-enforcement-action-combat-health-care-fraud-related-covid-19; RussiaUkraine War: Insights and Analysis, HARV. KENNEDY SCH., https://www.hks.harvard.edu/russiaukraine-war-insights-analysis (last visited Mar. 9, 2022); Katie Lobosco & Tami Luhby, Here’s
What’s in the Bipartisan Infrastructure Package, CNN (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.cnn.com
/2021/07/28/politics/infrastructure-bill-explained/index.html.
2. See Diana Manos, GOP Puts Heat on Obama’s ‘Costly’ Medicare Fraud-Fighting
Technology, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (Dec. 28, 2010, 10:41AM), https://www.healthcareitnews
.com/news/gop-puts-heat-obamas-costly-medicare-fraud-fighting-technology.
3. See Brooke Henderson, Covid-19 Vaccine Scams Grow, Leveraging Confusion About How
to Get the Shot, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2021, 5:30AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19vaccine-scams-grow-leveraging-confusion-about-how-to-get-the-shot-11614076200.
4. See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116–136,
134 Stat. 367 (2020); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No 116–
139, 134 Stat. 622 (2020); Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 116–123, 134 Stat. 156 (2020); Medicare Telemedicine Health Care Provider
Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.cms.gov
/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-telemedicine-health-care-provider-fact-sheet.
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fraud will flourish in the gaps. 5 Third, regardless of these new developments,
existing forms of fraud will continue, particularly in the pharmaceutical
industry. 6 In short, the Biden administration will have no choice but to devote
significant resources to fraud enforcement.
Part II of this Article analyzes the effects that different presidential
administrations may have on health care fraud enforcement, addressing not only
the financial results of enforcement efforts but also changes in anti-fraud rhetoric
and evolving enforcement priorities. Part III addresses the specific fraud
challenges facing the Biden administration, including COVID-19, the
incomplete transition from volume- to value-based payment, and more
traditional forms of fraud.
II. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE CHANGING PRIORITY OF
HEALTH CARE FRAUD
While health care fraud remains a constant baseline concern, the primacy of
fraud enforcement as a federal priority has varied by presidential
administration. 7 Some reasons may be political: Republican presidents, for
example, have been viewed as more friendly to private industry (including the
pharmaceutical lobby) than their Democratic counterparts. 8 Despite the
traditional mantra that Republicans are “tough on crime,” that has not
necessarily held true for health care fraud enforcement, at least when that
enforcement is spearheaded by Democrats. 9 Indeed, powerful Republican
Senator Charles Grassley opposed some of the Obama administration’s fraud
funding requests, arguing that “Medicare fraud data doesn’t support rhetoric or
spending to crack down on criminal healthcare fraud.” 10 Yet while there may be
some truth to these allegations, they are by no means the entire story. 11 Trends
5. Joan H. Krause, Following the Money in Health Care Fraud: Reflections on a ModernDay Yellow Brick Road, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 343, 350 (2010) (describing factors that allow fraud
to flourish in complex billing systems).
6. See id. at 353 (describing multi-year focus on pharmaceutical fraud).
7. See Ben Penn, U.S. Attorney Vacancies Collide with Biden Corporate Crime Fight,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 10, 2021, 3:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/u-s-attor
ney-vacancies-may-slow-biden-corporate-crime-fight.
8. See, e.g., Ben Casselman & Jim Tankersley, Looking for Bipartisan Accord? Just Ask
About Big Business, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/14/business
/economy/big-business-politics-economy.html (describing potential changes in attitudes); Lev
Facher & Kaitlyn Bartley, Pharma is Showering Congress with Cash, Even as Drug Makers Race
to Fight the Coronavirus, STAT NEWS (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/feature/pre
scription-politics/prescription-politics/ (noting that 53.5% of donations “went to GOP lawmakers
or Republican-aligned groups”).
9. See, e.g., Republican Views on Crime, REPUBLICAN VIEWS (Aug. 29, 2015),
https://www.republicanviews.org/republican-views-on-crime/; Manos, supra note 2.
10. Manos, supra note 2.
11. See id.
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in health care fraud enforcement are influenced by many factors, both domestic
and global. 12 And while an administration may set priorities, the bulk of
enforcement efforts are carried out by career bureaucrats rather than their
politically appointed bosses. 13 As a result, changes in fraud enforcement tend to
be incremental rather than rapid.
A.

Key Anti-Fraud Statutes

Although a number of federal statutes are used to reach fraudulent health
care activities, key statutes include the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Kickback
Statute, the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (Stark Law), and the Civil False
Claims Act (FCA). 14 The Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits offering, paying,
soliciting, or receiving remuneration to induce someone to refer patients or to
purchase, lease, or order any item or service for which payment may be made
by a federal health care program. 15 Violation of the statute is a criminal felony,
punishable by up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $25,000, as well as
exclusion from the federal health care programs; in the alternative, civil
monetary penalties (CMPs) of up to $50,000 per violation, plus three times the
remuneration, may be imposed in an administrative proceeding. 16 The Stark Law
is a civil statute designed to prohibit the referral of Medicare and Medicaid
patients to health care entities with which the referring physician (or an
immediate family member) has a financial relationship through ownership,
investment, or compensation. 17 In addition to barring payment for services
furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral, the statute imposes CMPs and the
threat of exclusion, making the claimant ineligible to participate in any of the
federal health care programs. 18
By far the biggest financial recoveries accrue under the FCA, a Civil Warera statute originally enacted to prevent fraud on the Union Army. 19 The basic
false claims prohibition imposes liability on a defendant when: (1) the defendant
presents or causes to be presented a claim for payment or approval; (2) the claim
12. See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 3.
13. Indeed, after nearly eleven months in office, President Biden had yet to fill two-thirds of
U.S. Attorneys slots, leaving many districts without (semi)permanent political appointee oversight.
Penn, supra note 7.
14. Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)–(b); Stark Law, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395nn(a)(1); False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
16. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (fine/imprisonment); § 1320a-7(a) (exclusion); § 1320a-7a(a)(10) (civil
monetary penalties).
17. Off. of Inspector Gen., Fraud & Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/fraud-abuse-laws/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
18. § 1395nn(g)(3).
19. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33. For a history of the statute, see Joan H. Krause, Health Care
Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act,
36 GA. L. REV. 121, 128 (2001).
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is false or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant’s acts are undertaken “knowingly,”
which includes not only actual knowledge, but also deliberate ignorance or
reckless disregard of truth or falsity. 20 After June 19, 2020, violators are subject
to a civil penalty of $11,665 to $23,331 per claim, plus three times the damages
the government sustained from the fraud. 21
A key aspect of the FCA enforcement scheme is that the statute permits civil
prosecution not only by the Department of Justice (DOJ) but also by private
parties, through a qui tam provision that permits a private “relator” to bring suit
on the government’s behalf; if successful, the relator may receive fifteen to thirty
percent of the proceeds. 22 Since amendments in 1986 modernized the FCA and
made it more lucrative to pursue qui tam actions, the number of health carerelated suits has grown exponentially: in 2021 there were 388 new qui tam cases
involving the federal health care programs compared to only three in 1987,
resulting in recoveries of over $1.4 billion. 23 As a result of the qui tam
provisions, the FCA can be invoked not only by federal prosecutors but also by
competitors, employees, and even patients. 24 Not only does this vastly increase
exposure for health care providers, but it means that a large segment of FCA
cases are not, at least initially, controlled by federal prosecutors—and not
subject to the current administration’s control. 25
B.

Fraud by the Numbers

For all the attention that has been devoted to health care fraud over the years,
there remains surprising uncertainty. Critics commonly assert that ten percent of
health care expenditures are fraudulent, yet that estimate has little empirical
support. 26 The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has calculated
the rate of improper payments in the Medicare fee-for-service program since
1996, although the methodology has varied. 27 Since the most recent
methodology change in 2011, the error rate did not consistently drop below ten
percent until 2017; the rates for fiscal years 2020 and 2021 were lower still,

20. § 3729(a)–(b).
21. § 3802(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 85.5 (2021).
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b), (d).
23. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW (2021), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/press-release/file/1467811/download.
24. Joan H. Krause, Twenty-Five Years of Health Law Through the Lens of the Civil False
Claims Act, 19 ANNALS HEALTH LAW & LIFE SCIS. 13, 15 (2010).
25. See id. at 16 (describing qui tam suits).
26. The Challenge of Healthcare Fraud, NAT’L HEALTHCARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS’N,
https://www.nhcaa.org/tools-insights/about-health-care-fraud/the-challenge-of-health-care-fraud/
(last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
27. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE 2012 IMPROPER
PAYMENTS REPORT 11–12 (2012).
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reaching less than 6.3%. 28 Although the error rate is not in itself a measure of
fraud, primarily identifying problems with documentation, it does provide a
valuable window into the vulnerabilities of the federal health care programs. 29
TABLE 1: HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM RESULTS,
1998-2020 30
Fiscal Year

New Criminal
Investigations

Defendants
Convicted

New Civil
Investigations

Exclusions

Total
Judgments/
Settlements

1998 31

322

326

107

3,021

$480
million

1999 32

371

396

91

2,976

$524
million

2000 33

457

467

233

3,350

$1.2 billion

2001 34

445

465

188

3,756

$1.7 billion

28. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE ERROR RATE TESTING
(CERT) (2020), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Pro
grams/Improper-Payment-Measurement-Programs/Cert. While the Biden administration has taken
credit for this historically low error rate, the 2021 report was actually based on an analysis of claims
submitted between July 2019 and June 2020, squarely during the Trump administration. See CTR.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2021 MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE SUPPLEMENTAL
IMPROPER PAYMENT DATA 1 (2021); CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., BIDEN-HARRIS
ADMINISTRATION ANNOUNCES MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE ESTIMATED IMPROPER PAYMENTS
DECLINE BY OVER $20 BILLION SINCE 2014 (2021).
29. Of course, the reports only address the errors we can identify; there is no comparable
method to measure activities that evade detection. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO
STEAL: HOW FRAUD BLEEDS AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2 (2nd ed. 2000) (“What you see
is not the problem. It’s what we don’t see that really does the damage.”).
30. Health Care Fraud & Abuse Control Program Report, OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/reports-and-publications/hcfac/index.asp (last visited
Feb. 10, 2022).
31. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998, at 1–2 (1999) [hereinafter 1998 HCFAC
Rep.].
32. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1999, at 1, 8 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 HCFAC
Rep.].
33. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2000, at 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 HCFAC Rep.].
34. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2001, at 1–2 (2002), [hereinafter 2001 HCFAC
Rep.].
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2002 35

361

480

221

3,448

$1.8 billion

2003 36

362

437

231

3,275

$1.8 billion

2004 37

1,002

459

868

3,293

$605
million

2005 38

935

523

778

3,804

$1.47
billion

2006 39

836

547

915

3,422

$2.2 billion

2007 40

878

560

776

3,308

$1.8 billion

2008 41

957

588

843

3,129

$1.0 billion

2009 42

1,014

583

886

2,556

$1.63
billion

2010 43

1,116

726

942

3,340

$2.5 billion

2011 44

1,100

743

977

2,662

$2.4 billion

35. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2002, at 1–2 (2003) [hereinafter 2002 HCFAC
Rep.].
36. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT For FY 2003, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 HCFAC Rep.].
37. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2004, at 1–2, 11 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 HCFAC
Rep.].
38. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT For FY 2005, at 1, 19 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 HCFAC
Rep.].
39. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2006, at 1, 25 (2007) [hereinafter 2006 HCFAC
Rep.].
40. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2007, at 1, 25 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 HCFAC
Rep.].
41. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2008, at 1, 23 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 HCFAC
Rep.].
42. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2009, at 1, 32 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 HCFAC
Rep.].
43. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2010, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 2010 HCFAC Rep.].
44. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2011, at 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter 2011 HCFAC
Rep.].
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2012 45

1,131

826

885

3,131

$3.0 billion

2013 46

1,013

718

1,083

3,214

$2.6 billion

2014 47

924

734

782

4,017

$2.3 billion

2015 48

983

613

808

4,112

$1.9 billion

2016 49

975

658

930

3,635

$2.5 billion

2017 50

967

639

948

3,244

$2.4 billion

2018 51

1,139

479

918

2,712

$2.3 billion

2019 52

1,060

528

1,112

2,640

$2.6 billion

2020 53

1,148

440

1,079

2,148

$1.8 billion

As Table 1 indicates, the government’s fraud enforcement efforts have
varied over time. Some of those variations track the enforcement policy changes
described below, while others do not. 54 Apart from an early high point during
the George W. Bush administration, for example, new criminal investigations
reached a consistent high during the Obama administration, with its emphasis
on criminal sanctions for fraud. 55 Yet the number of new criminal investigations
45. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2012, at 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 HCFAC
Rep.].
46. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2013, at 1–2 (2014) [hereinafter 2013 HCFAC
Rep.].
47. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2014, at 1–2 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 HCFAC
Rep.].
48. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2015, at 1–2 (2016) hereinafter 2015 HCFAC
Rep.].
49. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2016, at 1–2 (2017) [hereinafter 2016 HCFAC
Rep.].
50. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2017, at 1 (2018) [hereinafter 2017 HCFAC Rep.].
51. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2018, at 3 (2019) [hereinafter 2018 HCFAC Rep.].
52. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2019, at 1 [hereinafter 2019 HCFAC Rep.].
53. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. & DEP’T JUST., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2020, at 1 [hereinafter 2020 HCFAC Rep.].
54. See infra Section II.B.
55. See supra tbl. 1 (new criminal investigations spiked in 2004, before decreasing and then
remaining high between 2009 and 2016).
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rose higher still during the Trump administration, even with a seemingly more
defendant-friendly approach. 56 Despite the growing number of new
investigations, however, the number of convictions followed a different path,
increasing during the Obama administration to a high in 2012, only to begin a
slow decline that would become a precipitous drop during President Donald
Trump’s time in office. 57
New civil investigations have also fluctuated, growing during the first half
of President Barack Obama’s time in office, only to drop and then rebound under
President Trump. 58 With a few year-to-year exceptions, exclusions from the
federal health care programs remained similar during the Bush and Obama
administrations, with an increase in the latter part of the Obama administration
that was reversed by President Trump. 59 And the total amount of judgments and
settlements grew slowly during the Clinton and Bush administrations, reaching
a high point during the Obama administration in 2012 before falling off; in both
2015 and 2020, recoveries reached a low more typical of the latter part of the
Bush administration. 60
It is difficult to draw accurate conclusions from these numbers, however.
Fraud cases are multi-year undertakings, often requiring years of background
investigation before a complaint is filed, followed by attempts at negotiation and
then, perhaps, by trial and subsequent appeals. 61 The infamous case of United
States v. Krizek, for example, began with an audit of billing codes used by
District of Columbia psychiatrists in 1988 and the execution of a subpoena by
the HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in 1989, followed by a request
for records in 1991, a demand letter issued in 1992, a year of failed negotiations,
a three-week bench trial in 1994, multiple appeals, and a final judgment paid in
2002—a period that began during the first Bush administration, spanned
President Bill Clinton’s entire time in office, and ended only after the second
Bush was elected President. 62
Focusing too closely on annual recoveries similarly paints an incomplete
picture of fraud enforcement. It is impossible to judge the effectiveness of
enforcement efforts by looking to recoveries in any single year, chiefly because

56. See supra tbl. 1 (new criminal investigations rose after 2017).
57. See supra tbl. 1 (criminal convictions rose between 2009 and 2012 before falling).
58. See supra tbl. 1 (new civil investigations rose between 2009 and 2013, then dropped and
rebounded in 2016).
59. See supra tbl. 1 (exclusions remained stable between 2001 and 2011, grew between 2012
and 2016, and dropped after 2017).
60. See supra tbl. 1 (total judgments grew steadily until 2012 before falling off).
61. 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53, at 92.
62. See Joan H. Krause & Timothy L. Greaney, United States v. Krizek: Rough Justice Under
the Civil False Claims Act, in HEALTH LAW AND BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 187, 188–96
(Sandra Johnson et al. eds., 2009) (describing the tortured history of Krizek litigation).
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those numbers can be skewed by a few large settlements. 63 The record three
billion dollars in judgments and settlements in 2012, for example, was driven by
one massive settlement with GlaxoSmithKline, resolving both criminal and civil
liability related to the company’s drugs. 64 Moreover, because large settlements
may be negotiated in one year but collected over subsequent years, settlements
and judgments in one fiscal year usually do not equal recoveries in that same
year. 65 Although the government won or negotiated only $1.8 billion in health
care fraud judgments and settlements in fiscal year (FY) 2020, for example, it
actually collected almost $3.1 billion due to cases resolved in prior years. 66
It is too early to assess the results of fraud enforcement under the Biden
administration. Federal FY 2020, the latest year for which full data is available,
ran from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020, yet President Biden was
not sworn in until January 2021. 67 The 2020 numbers, then, are the numbers for
the final year of the Trump administration, just as the numbers for 2016 reflected
the end of the Obama administration. 68 Moreover, it may take several years for
DOJ staff to complete their work on investigations already in progress when the
presidential administration changes. For now, it remains too early to know the
financial impact of the Biden administration on health care fraud enforcement,
although there have been indications that some policies will indeed change. 69
C. Rhetoric and Money
Whether or not health care fraud is at the top of the presidential agenda is
often signaled not only by rhetoric, but also by whether that rhetoric is supported
by budget requests. When former Attorney General Janet Reno designated
health care fraud as the DOJ’s “number two” priority in 1994, second only to
violent crime, the Clinton administration signaled that health care fraud would

63. See 2012 HCFAC Rep., supra note 45, at 1, 19.
64. Id.; GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and
Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 2, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr
/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-failure-report.
65. 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53, at 1.
66. Id.
67. Budget of the U.S. Government, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/budget (last visited Feb.
16, 2022).
68. See 2016 HCFAC Rep., supra note 49; 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53.
69. Michael D. Granston, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the ABA
Civil False Claims Act and Qui Tam Enforcement Institute (Dec. 2, 2020), https://www.justice
.gov/opa/speech/remarks-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-michael-d-granston-aba-civil-falseclaims-act. As an early indicator of the Biden administration’s work, the DOJ announced in
February 2022 that the FY 2021 FCA numbers exceeded $5.6 billion. Off. of Pub. Affs., Justice
Department’s False Claims Act Settlements and Judgments Exceed $5.6 Billion in Fiscal Year
2021, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-s-falseclaims-act-settlements-and-judgments-exceed-56-billion-fiscal-year.
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be a national priority. 70 That rhetoric was backed up by the legislative effort that
resulted in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
which not only defined a series of new health care crimes, but also created the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control (HCFAC) Program to oversee federal
enforcement efforts. 71 Some portion of the anti-fraud budget is set by statute:
under HIPAA, money recovered from health care fraud enforcement efforts is
available for appropriation back to the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control
Account (Control Account), which specifically funds fraud enforcement activity
by the DOJ and HHS. 72 Appropriations to the Control Account are set by the
Secretary of HHS and the Attorney General, who jointly certify the amounts
necessary to fund anti-fraud programs each year within broad ranges set by
Congress. 73
The President remains free to request additional anti-fraud resources if that
matches other priorities. President Obama’s 2010 budget proposal, for example,
requested fifty percent more in increased anti-fraud funding compared to 2009,
which he estimated to save $2.7 billion over five years—a request occurring
simultaneously with the effort to expand health insurance coverage under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). 74 The Obama
administration was not shy about making that link explicit; as a 2009 60 Minutes
segment noted, “President Obama says rising costs are driving huge federal
budget deficits that imperil our future, and that there is enough waste and fraud
in the system to pay for health care reform if it was eliminated.” 75
During the initial months of the Biden presidency, health care fraud did not
appear to be a rhetorical or budgetary priority. 76 Despite proposing a 23.4%
increase in the HHS budget for FY 2022 and offering reforms that ranged from
rebuilding the public health infrastructure to improving Medicare and Medicaid
coverage and lowering prescription drug costs, President Biden’s budget

70. See JANET RENO, DEP’T JUST., 1994 ANN. REP. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (in Chapter I, Health
Care Fraud).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c.
72. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936,
1992, 1994 (1996); § 1395i(k)(3) (describing appropriations to the Control Account); Joan H.
Krause, A Patient-Centered Approach to Health Care Fraud Recovery, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 579, 596 (2006) (describing HIPAA funding mechanism).
73. § 1395i(k)(3)(A)(i).
74. See Off. Pub. Affs., Attorney General Holder and HHS Secretary Sebelius Announce New
Interagency Health Care Fraud Prevention & Enforcement Action Team, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-and-hhs-secretary-sebelius-announcenew-interagency-health-care-fraud (updated Oct. 8, 2014).
75. Medicare Fraud: A $60 Billion Crime, 60 MINUTES (Oct. 25, 2009, 1:42 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/medicare-fraud-a-60-billion-crime-23-10-2009/.
76. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2022 (2021) (describing enforcement priorities).
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proposal did not single out health care fraud and abuse for additional funding. 77
Indeed, HHS requested $2.4 million less in funding for Medicare and Medicaid
oversight for FY 2022 than in the FY 2021 budget, 78 and the DOJ requested $2.2
million less. 79
D. Changes in Enforcement Policy
While rhetoric and budget requests function as public markers of a
commitment to preventing fraud, the operational effect of changing priorities is
achieved by more granular evolution of the documents that guide federal
prosecutors. Because of significant overlap in the conduct covered by civil,
administrative, and criminal fraud laws, the choice of whether a case will be
pursued as a criminal or civil matter, or perhaps declined altogether, is often left
to prosecutorial discretion. 80 Those choices are influenced by “prosecution
guidelines, enforcement initiatives, and both formal and informal interagency
understandings regarding which agency has primary jurisdiction in different
types of cases—all of which are subject to change” depending on the
administration. 81 Those changes have been evident not only historically, but also
in recent actions by President Biden to undo some of the changes made by his
predecessor. 82
As demonstrated by Table 1, while civil fraud prosecutions were prominent
for much of the Bush administration, the early years of the Obama
administration saw a greater focus on criminal investigations. 83 That change was
also evident in a 2014 announcement that the DOJ Civil Division would share
all new private FCA complaints with the DOJ Criminal Division as soon as they
were filed, significantly increasing the chances that qui tam suits would be
accompanied by parallel criminal proceedings. 84 When President Trump took
office, the guidance pivoted, with the administration adopting far more
defendant-friendly policies. A memorandum issued in January 2018 by Michael
D. Granston, the Director of the Fraud Section of the DOJ’s Commercial
Litigation Branch, encouraged the dismissal of many private FCA cases based
77. Id. at 17, 24, 57.
78. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2022:
JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR CONGRESS 16 (2022).
79. DEP’T JUST., FISCAL YEAR 2022 BUDGET REQUEST AT A GLANCE 17, 24, 57 (2021)
(explaining the difference as “due to changes in CARES Act related mandatory sequester
suspension.”).
80. Krause, supra note 5, at 358 (describing choice of enforcement pathways).
81. Id.
82. Exec. Order No. 13,992, 86 Fed. Reg. 7049 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“Revocation of Certain
Executive Orders Concerning Federal Regulation”).
83. See supra tbl. 1 (showing an increase in the number of criminal investigations during the
first years of the Obama administration).
84. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att’y Gen., Crim. Div., Remarks at the Taxpayers Against
Fraud Education Fund Conference (Sept. 17, 2014).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

REVISITING HEALTH CARE FRAUD IN THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

373

on factors that could include the need to curb “meritless” qui tam suits, prevent
“parasitic or opportunistic” qui tam suits, avoid interference with agency
policies, control litigation brought on the government’s behalf, safeguard
classified or national security information, and preserve government
resources. 85
These changing enforcement policies may have very practical effects on
ongoing litigation. Pharmaceutical companies Eli Lilly and Bayer, for example,
became embroiled in litigation involving the Trump administration’s
commitment to dismiss qui tam suits. 86 In September 2019, a federal district
court judge upheld the government’s dismissal of a suit brought by relator Health
Choice Alliance alleging the companies had knowingly induced the submission
of false claims by violating the Anti-Kickback Statute with regard to various
marketing and reimbursement activities. 87 The government’s decision was based
on factors echoing the Granston Memorandum: questions regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence and legal support for the alleged theories of fraud,
the costs to the government of maintaining the action, potential interference with
the policy interests of the federal health care programs, and concerns over the
“investigative methods employed by” the relator. 88 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 89
The Trump administration also mounted a multifaceted attack on the
practice of using noncompliance with informal agency guidance documents as
the basis for prosecution. 90 In a November 2017 memorandum on the
“Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents,” then-Attorney General Jeff
Sessions stressed the importance of using notice-and-comment rulemaking to
establish agency policy and directed the DOJ not to use “guidance [to] create
binding standards by which the Department will determine compliance with
existing regulatory or statutory requirements.” 91 In January 2018, thenAssociate Attorney General Rachel Brand clarified that the DOJ “may not use
its enforcement authority to effectively convert guidance documents into
binding rules,” and that prosecutors “may not use noncompliance with guidance
documents as a basis for proving violations of applicable law” in civil cases. 92
85. See Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Dir., Com. Litig. Branch, Fraud Section, on
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), at 3–6 (Jan. 10, 2018).
86. Health Choice All. LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-CV-00126, 2019
WL 4727422, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2019); In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 870 F.3d 960, 961 (8th
Cir. 2017).
87. Health Choice All., 2019 WL 4727422, at *1, *8.
88. United States ex rel. Health Choice All. v. Eli Lilly, 4 F.4th 255, 260 (5th Cir. 2021).
89. Id. at 269.
90. Memorandum from the Att’y Gen. to All Components on Prohibition on Improper
Guidance Documents (Nov. 16, 2017).
91. Id.
92. Memorandum from Rachel Brand, Associate Att’y Gen. to Heads of Civil Litigating
Components and United States Attorney on Limiting Use of Agency Guidance Documents in
Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases (Jan. 25, 2018).
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In October 2019, President Trump doubled down on the requirement of official
rulemaking, issuing an Executive Order on “Promoting the Rule of Law through
Improved Agency Guidance Documents.” 93
Given the key role of guidance documents in many FCA cases, particularly
those involving Medicare and Medicaid rules, the new policy left many
uncertain about future enforcement. 94 President Biden did not waste any time
addressing the issue: he revoked the Executive Order, among others, on his first
day in office. 95 In July 2021, Attorney General Merrick Garland rescinded both
the Sessions and Brand memoranda, reiterating the importance of informal
agency guidance and permitting the DOJ to use such guidance in “any
appropriate and lawful circumstances, including when a guidance document
may be entitled to deference or otherwise carry persuasive weight with respect
to the meaning of the applicable legal requirements.” 96
A similar evolution has occurred in the DOJ’s approach to prosecuting
corporate fraud, an area of major concern given the number of corporate entities
in the health care market. During the Clinton administration, the DOJ issued a
memorandum on “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” setting forth the factors
that would guide the decision of whether to bring federal charges against a
corporation, including the corporation’s willingness to waive the attorney-client
and work product privileges in order to demonstrate cooperation. 97 In the wake
of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Bush administration revised the
guidance to include consideration of whether the responsible individuals could
be prosecuted, but appeared to back off from the demand that corporations waive
the privileges. 98 In 2015, the Obama DOJ released the “Yates Memorandum,”
vowing to pursue action against both corporations and any individuals involved

93. Exec. Order No. 13,891, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,235 (Oct. 9, 2019).
94. One law firm explained the effect of the policy on the Medicare Claims Processing
Manual, noting that “the DOJ could no longer actively enforce the instruction manual that every
provider in America relied upon for decades when billing Medicare (or other similar agency
manuals). It could use these documents to evince scienter (i.e., knowledge that they were breaking
the rules), but what good was that if the rules were not binding?” Jason Marcus, Attorney General
Merrick Garland Rescinds the Infamous Brand Memo, BRACKER & MARCUS LLC (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.fcacounsel.com/blog/attorney-general-merrick-garland-rescinds-infamous-brandmemo/.
95. Exec. Order No. 13,992, supra note 82.
96. Memorandum from Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen. to Heads of All Department Components
on Issuance and Use of Guidance Documents by the Department of Justice (July 1, 2021); see also
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2420 (2019) (noting an agency guidance document by “itself
never forms ‘the basis for an enforcement action’ because” such documents cannot “impose any
‘legally binding requirements’ on private parties”).
97. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Att’y Gen. to All Component Heads and
U.S. Att’ys on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16, 1999).
98. See Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1589, 1598 (2018)
(discussing the memoranda).
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in the wrongdoing, and making clear that in order to be eligible for cooperation
credit, the company must identify all the individuals who were involved in or
responsible for the misconduct. 99 Under President Trump, however, Deputy
Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein noted that while “the notion that companies
should be required to locate and report to the government every person involved
in alleged misconduct in any way, regardless of their role, may sound
reasonable,” it was not feasible in practice; by 2018, the DOJ had pulled back to
require the identification only of “individuals substantially involved in or
responsible for the misconduct” at issue. 100
After initial silence, the Biden administration waded into the debate in late
October 2021, reviving and reinvigorating the approach originally taken in the
Yates memorandum. 101 In a keynote address at the American Bar Association’s
National Institute on White Collar Crime, Deputy Attorney General Lisa
Monaco announced that it was “unambiguously this department’s first priority
in corporate criminal matters to prosecute the individuals who commit and profit
from corporate malfeasance.” 102 The policy reinstituted the requirement that a
corporation identify all individuals involved in the misconduct and provide the
DOJ with all relevant non-privileged information about those individuals. 103 The
DOJ also made clear that it would take into account the full range of prior
misconduct by the company—not just similar types of misbehavior—in
determining the proper disposition of an investigation. 104 Repeated wrongdoing
by corporations, even if spread among different areas of responsibility, will thus
play a greater role than in the past. 105 Although some of these changes may
appear to be only ones of degree, overall they do signal a different approach to
general corporate fraud issues.
III. FRAUD CHALLENGES FACING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
While the enthusiasm for engaging in anti-fraud efforts varies by
administration, it really is a question of how, rather than if, health care fraud will
be a significant part of the federal enforcement agenda. Where will the Biden
administration focus its health care fraud efforts? Although it may be too early
99. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen. to Assistant Att’y Gens. of
the Antitrust, Civil, Crim., Env’t and Natural Resources, Nat’l Sec., and Tax Div.; Dir. of the Fed.
Bureau of Investigation; Dir. of the Exec. Off. for U.S. Trustees; and All U.S. Att’ys on Individual
Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015).
100. Att’y Gen. Rod J. Rosenstein, Remarks at the American Conference Institute’s 35th
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2018).
101. Deputy Att’y Gen. Lisa O. Monaco, ABA’s 36th National Institute on White Collar Crime
(Oct. 28, 2021).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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to tell, three areas are likely to demand continued attention: (1) the COVID-19
pandemic, including not only the disbursement of large amounts of federal
funding, but also the loosening of traditional limits on Medicare reimbursement
for telehealth; (2) the ongoing transition from volume- to value-based forms of
payment, and the varying forms of fraud incentivized by each; and (3) the
continuing vitality of more typical forms of fraud, particularly in the
pharmaceutical industry.
A.

Pandemic-Related Fraud

The single biggest health care fraud concern facing President Biden is, of
course, the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has disrupted life as we knew
it in ways far too numerous to list here. 106 For the purposes of health care fraud,
however, two of the government’s COVID-19 initiatives have been key. First,
the government has allocated large sums of money to the health care industry,
both as a general economic stimulus and to provide funding for COVID-related
care. 107 To the extent fraud follows funding, we can anticipate a growing number
of enforcement efforts aimed at providers who fail to use the funding for its
intended purposes. 108 Second, to ease disruptions in traditional in-person care,
the government has waived many existing limitations, such as permitting the
broader use of telehealth services and suspending some of the traditional fraud
and abuse authorities during the public health emergency. 109 Both efforts are
likely to create opportunities for fraud to flourish.
The pandemic certainly has created opportunities for basic types of fraud
schemes aimed at consumers and other purchasers. When vaccines were initially
in short supply, unscrupulous individuals set up web sites purporting to sell the
(free) shots. 110 When personal protective equipment was scarce, fraudsters
created schemes to sell counterfeit or nonexistent equipment to health care
facilities. 111 Efforts to prey on a fearful public by marketing false COVID

106. Abid Haleem & Mohd Javaid, Effects of COVID-19 Pandemic in Daily Life, 10 CURRENT
MED. RSCH. PRAC. 78, 78 (2020).
107. See, e.g., CARES Act, 134 Stat. 367.
108. See, e.g., Allie Reed, Doctors Asked to Repay $100 Million in Covid Aid Absent Reports,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 30, 2022, 3:07 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-busi
ness/doctors-asked-to-repay-100-million-in-covid-aid-absent-reports (describing efforts to recoup
money from health care providers who received first round of PRG funding).
109. Medicare Telemedicine Health Care Provider Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
110. See Henderson, supra note 3.
111. See, e.g., Georgia Man Arrested for Attempting to Defraud the Department of Veterans
Affairs in a Multimillion-Dollar COVID-19 Scam, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/georgia-man-arrested-attempting-defraud-departmentveterans-affairs-multimillion-dollar (alleged attempt to sell nonexistent respirator masks in
exchange for large upfront payment).
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“cures” flourished. 112 The influx of large amounts of funding, however, has been
a literal game-changer for fraud schemes.
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) and
subsequent relief legislation allocated more than $175 billion in provider relief
funds to hospitals and front-line health care providers, to be disbursed by the
Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA). 113 Those funds,
however, come with a caveat: providers must agree to use the money only for
specified purposes and must agree to abide by the program’s terms and
conditions. 114 Not surprisingly, given the amount of money at stake, there is
concern that some providers have accepted those funds but failed to comply with
those conditions, or found ways to bill the program unnecessarily—the exact
types of schemes actionable under the FCA by both federal prosecutors and qui
tam relators. 115 The 2020 HCFAC Report identified four types of COVIDrelated fraud investigated by the government: additional or unnecessary
services, such as offering COVID-19 tests to Medicare beneficiaries in return
for their personal information; unnecessary laboratory testing paired with
COVID-19 tests, such as allergy or genetic testing; falsely representing to
insurers the provision of COVID-19 tests and treatment; and fraudulently
obtaining relief funds, including filing false claims and applications. 116
The federal government has responded to these threats by prioritizing
COVID-related fraud enforcement. 117 One of the first prosecutions was a May
2020 case charging a Georgia woman with conspiracy to defraud Medicare by
paying kickbacks in exchange for referring Medicare beneficiaries for
unnecessary genetic screening and COVID-19 tests. 118 In December 2020, HHS
announced the creation of a False Claims Act Working Group in partnership
with the DOJ and OIG, citing the rising need for FCA investigations in light of
the “unprecedented levels of taxpayer support” offered through COVID-19
relief. 119 The Biden administration has embraced these enforcement efforts,
112. Meagan Flynn, Small-Time Actor Peddled Fake Coronavirus Cure to Millions Online,
Feds Charge in First Covid-19 Prosecution, WASH. POST (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/nation/2020/03/26/fake-coronavirus-cure-fraud.
113. General Distributions, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/providerrelief/data/general-distribution (last visited Feb. 19, 2022).
114. Terms and Conditions, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/providerrelief/past-payments/terms-conditions (last visited Feb. 19, 2021).
115. 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53, at 13.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Georgia Woman Arrested for Role in Scheme to Defraud Health Care Benefit Programs
Related to Cancer Genetic Testing and COVID-19 Testing, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 15, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/georgia-woman-arrested-role-scheme-defraud-health-care-benefitprograms-related-cancer.
119. HHS Announces False Claims Act Working Group to Enhance Efforts to Combat Fraud
and Focus Resources on Bad Actors, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Dec. 4, 2020),
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announcing a new DOJ COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force and publicly
announcing the filing of criminal charges against fourteen defendants
nationwide for pandemic-related fraud schemes in May 2021. 120 Those efforts
are likely to continue, and indeed to increase. In his first State of the Union
address in March of 2022, President Biden announced plans to focus on “major
targets of pandemic fraud, such as those committing large-scale identity theft,”
and called on Congress to provide additional resources and enact stricter
penalties. 121 Soon after, the DOJ announced that the agency had taken
enforcement action against more than eight billion dollars in alleged pandemic
relief fraud and appointed a new Director for COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement. 122
Another type of fraud exposure stems from the government’s efforts to
remove barriers to patient care created by the pandemic, particularly the
limitations imposed by restrictions on physician self-referral under the Stark
Law. 123 In March 2020, CMS issued a “blanket waiver” of sanctions under the
Stark Law relating to COVID-19, intending to provide flexibility to providers
with regard to their referral and compensation arrangements; in early April, OIG
issued a parallel statement confirming that the agency would not impose AntiKickback sanctions for activities covered by the Stark waivers. 124 Those waivers
are time-limited, expiring when the Secretary of HHS declares an end to the

https://public3.pagefreezer.com/browse/HHS%20%E2%80%93%C2%A0About%20News/20-012021T12:29/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/12/04/hhs-announces-false-claims-act-work
ing-group-enhance-efforts-combat-fraud-and-focus-resources-bad-actors.html.
120. DOJ Announces Coordinated Law Enforcement Action to Combat Health Care Fraud
Related to COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 26, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dojannounces-coordinated-law-enforcement-action-combat-health-care-fraud-related-covid-19;
Attorney General Announces Task Force to Combat COVID-19 Fraud, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (May 17,
2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-task-force-combat-covid-19fraud.
121. Fact Sheet: President Biden to Announce New Steps to Combat Criminal Fraud and
Identity Theft in Pandemic Relief Programs, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 1, 2022), https://www.white
house.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/01/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-announcenew-steps-to-combat-criminal-fraud-and-identity-theft-in-pandemic-relief-programs/.
122. Justice Department Announces Director for COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-directorcovid-19-fraud-enforcement.
123. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., BLANKET WAIVERS OF SECTION 1877(G)
OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT DUE TO DECLARATION OF COVID-19 OUTBREAK IN THE UNITED
STATES AS A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (Mar. 2020), https://www.cms.gov/files/document/covid19-blanket-waivers-section-1877g.pdf (waiving sanctions for certain violations of Stark Law
prohibitions on physician self-referral during the COVID-19 pandemic).
124. Id. at 1, 3; OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OIG POLICY
STATEMENT REGARDING APPLICATION OF CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT
AUTHORITIES DUE TO DECLARATION OF CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) OUTBREAK
IN THE UNITED STATES AS A NATIONAL EMERGENCY (Apr. 3, 2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/corona
virus/OIG-Policy-Statement-4.3.20.pdf.
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public health emergency. 125 While at present that date remains to be determined,
whenever it arrives, providers will have to untangle a number of arrangements
that otherwise may be in violation of the law. Moreover, to the extent the waivers
apply only for certain COVID-related purposes, we can anticipate investigations
against providers who intertwine their COVID- and non-COVID-related
activities or flatly mischaracterize their activities in an effort to take advantage
of the waivers.
The government also offered pandemic-related flexibility with regard to
telehealth services. 126 COVID-related disruptions to in-person care, whether due
to shelter-in-place requirements, lack of adequate facility space, or simple
precautionary measures, drove many providers to offer services remotely
through telephone and video chats. 127 Historically, Medicare offered little
coverage of telehealth services, limiting them mostly to rural areas. 128 In March
2020, however, CMS issued a waiver permitting Medicare to pay for medical
visits provided by telehealth nationwide, with no geographical restrictions;
telehealth coverage recently was extended through 2023. 129 Not surprisingly, the
result has been a significant increase in the number of telehealth visits—and in
potential telehealth fraud. 130
Even before the pandemic, telehealth services were on the Trump
administration’s fraud radar. 131 In September 2020, the DOJ announced the
largest health care fraud enforcement action in history, accusing 345 defendants
of fraudulently billing more than six billion dollars—$4.5 billion of which was
attributed to telemedicine schemes involving eighty-six defendants across the

125. See id. at 1 (noting that a public health emergency is a prerequisite for the waiver, so the
waiver will end when the Secretary declares the public health emergency is over).
126. See, e.g., CMS Physician Payment Rule Promotes Greater Access to Telehealth Services,
Diabetes Prevention Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 2, 2021),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-physician-payment-rule-promotes-greater-ac
cess-telehealth-services-diabetes-prevention-programs (noting an expansion of telehealth services
for behavioral health services).
127. LOK WONG SAMSON ET AL., OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION,
MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES’ USE OF TELEHEALTH IN 2020: TRENDS BY BENEFICIARY
CHARACTERISTICS AND LOCATION (Dec. 3, 2021), https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/medicare-beneficia
ries-use-telehealth-2020.
128. Medicare Telemedicine Health Care Provider Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/medicare-tele
medicine-health-care-provider-fact-sheet.
129. Id.; CMS Physician Payment Rule Promotes Greater Access to Telehealth Services, supra
note 126.
130. SAMSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 4 (finding that Medicare FFS telehealth visits increased
sixty-three-fold, from 840,000 in 2019 to almost 52.7 million in 2020).
131. National Health Care Fraud and Opioid Takedown Results in Charges Against 345
Defendants Responsible for More than $6 Billion in Alleged Fraud Losses, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept.
30, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/hcf-2020-takedown/press-release.
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country. 132 The allegations, which were based on pre-pandemic activities,
largely involved schemes by telemarketing companies that paid medical
personnel to order unnecessary equipment, testing, and medications with little
patient contact, then sold those orders to entities such as pharmacies and medical
equipment companies that would submit fraudulent bills for those items to
Medicare. 133
The Biden administration, however, has taken pains to distinguish these
“telefraud” schemes from the types of telehealth fraud likely to arise due to
COVID-19 flexibility. 134 Unlike schemes designed to obtain payment for
ancillary items and services such as tests or medical equipment, COVID-related
telehealth fraud is likely to involve the types of fraud more characteristic of inperson care: upcoding, providing unnecessary services, or billing for services
that did not take place. 135 The industry certainly is aware of the increased
scrutiny. 136 As one health care attorney said, “[t]o the extent that there’s fraud
in telehealth and telemedicine, it’s no different from in-person care, and no more
frequent. And in some ways telehealth is better from a fraud perspective because
of the electronic trail it leaves behind.” 137 This additional electronic trail may
make it easier for government investigators to trace potential instances of fraud.
The Biden administration clearly has embraced fraud in telehealth expansion as
an enforcement priority, announcing criminal charges in September 2021
against nine defendants for, among other things, exploiting the provisions of the
telehealth waivers. 138 These efforts are likely to become more common over the
next few years.

132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See Christi A. Grimm, Principal Deputy Inspector General Grimm on Telehealth, OFF.
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 26, 2021), https://oig.hhs.gov
/coronavirus/letter-grimm-02262021.asp (clarifying differences).
135. Matthew Sitton, Telemedicine Fraud During the Pandemic and Beyond, AM. HEALTH L.
ASS’N (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.americanhealthlaw.org/content-library/publications/briefings
/2b1ccdee-f1f1-4502-910d-861e6b6195bd/telemedicine-fraud-during-the-pandemic-and-beyond.
136. See Christopher Brown, Federal Audits of Telehealth to Shape Its Post-Pandemic Future,
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 8, 2021, 4:35 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-andbusiness/federal-audits-of-telehealth-to-shape-its-post-pandemic-future (quoting Krista Drobac,
Executive Director of the Alliance for Connected Care).
137. Id.
138. National Health Care Fraud Enforcement Action Results in Charges Involving Over $1.4
Billion in Alleged Losses, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/na
tional-health-care-fraud-enforcement-action-results-charges-involving-over-14-billion. Notably,
DOJ also brought charges against forty-three defendants for submitting over $1.1 billion in
fraudulent claims in more typical “telefraud” schemes. Id.
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Transition from Volume- to Value-Based Payment

President Biden assumed office during a time of transition in federal health
care program reimbursement. Historically, health care in the United States—
including care rendered through the federal health care programs—has been
reimbursed using a “fee-for-service” (FFS) system in which providers are paid
for each separate service performed for a patient. 139 Not only does FFS
encourage overtreatment, inefficiency, and the fragmentation of care, it also
creates opportunity for fraud: the more care provided (or at least billed), the more
payment will be made, regardless of whether that care is necessary or high
quality. 140 For a number of years, both private and public payers tried to use
“managed care” strategies to control health care costs, imposing both risk-based
incentives and administrative controls to reduce unnecessary and nonbeneficial
care. 141 To the extent these strategies reduced costs, however, they did so in part
by limiting access to expensive treatments and restricting patients to limited
networks of providers. 142 While these strategies blunted incentives to provide
excessive care, they arguably went too far in the opposite direction, potentially
incentivizing providers to offer less treatment than needed or to prefer patients
less likely to need expensive care. 143 The result left both patients and health care
providers dissatisfied. 144
One of the key aspects of the ACA was to transform Medicare
reimbursement to reward providers for the value rather than the volume of
services—not simply by measuring costs alone, as managed care tried to do, but
by rewarding providers for offering higher-quality, more efficient, and bettercoordinated services. 145 Starting in 2013, hospitals became eligible for valuebased incentive payments if they met performance standards for the treatment of
139. Andrea R. Cunha et al., From Payment to Volume to Payment for Value, AM. HEALTH L.
CONNECTIONS (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.americanhealthlaw.org/content-library/connectionsmagazine/article/5ce6d888-da86-4f76-b130-6b07fed77eb0/from-payment-for-volume-to-pay
ment-for-value.
140. See Joan H. Krause, Integration, Fragmentation, and Human Nature: The Role of the
Fraud and Abuse Laws in a Changing Healthcare System, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S.
HEALTH LAW 852, 853 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2017).
141. Id. at 864, 869.
142. See Michael E. Porter & Robert S. Kaplan, How to Pay for Health Care, HARV. BUS.
REV., Jul.–Aug. 2016, at 88, 92 (explaining how capitation, a managed care strategy, “restrict[s]
patient choice and inhibit[s] provider competition”).
143. Id.
144. See Krause, supra note 140, at 869 (noting that managed care strategies “appeared to be
designed primarily to deny care” and resulted in “[p]hysician and patient dissatisfaction” that led
“to a managed care backlash”).
145. Porter & Kaplan, supra note 142, at 92; 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(p) (value-based payment
modifier for physicians); § 1395ww(o) (hospital value-based purchasing program); Medicare
Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 101(c), 129 Stat. 87, 92
(2015) (changing physician payment).
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specified conditions and procedures, such as acute myocardial infarction, heart
failure, and pneumonia. 146 A similar value-based modifier for physician services
went into effect in 2015, and transitioned to the Merit-Based Incentive Payment
System (MIPS) in 2019 in accordance with the Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA). 147 Other ACA provisions designed to
improve the coordination of care included a national pilot program to examine
bundling payments “for integrated care during an episode of care” as well as a
new program to “support the patient-centered medical home,” a model for the
delivery of comprehensive primary care using a range of coordinated and
interdisciplinary services designed to manage chronic conditions. 148
Perhaps the centerpiece of the volume-to-value-based transition was the
creation of the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), which encouraged
multilevel groups of health care providers to form accountable care
organizations (ACOs) through which they would share accountability for the
cost and quality of care for a group of Medicare beneficiaries. 149 Although the
program has gone through several different iterations, the initial plan was for
ACOs to start on a one-sided risk model in which they shared in savings if their
per capita Medicare expenditures fell below a benchmark, and subsequently to
transition to a two-sided risk model in which they shared both savings and
losses. 150 The goals of the MSSP were nothing short of transformative: “to
promote accountability for a patient population, coordinate items and services
furnished to beneficiaries under Medicare Parts A and B, and encourage
investments in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and
efficient service delivery.” 151
Despite these lofty goals, the ACA’s value-based provisions seemed to be
at odds with the fraud prohibitions. Under many value-based arrangements,
providers who generate referrals (such as physicians) and those who receive
referrals (such as hospitals) would be working together to coordinate patient care
in return for potential financial gain—behavior the fraud laws were designed to

146. § 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I); Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-PatientAssessment-Instruments/HospitalQualityInits/Hospital-Value-Based-Purchasing- (last updated
Dec. 1, 2021).
147. § 1395w-4(p), (q) (original ACA value-based physician modifiers & MIPS respectively);
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, § 101(c), 129 Stat.
87, 92 (2015).
148. § 1395cc–4(a)(1) (bundled payments); § 256a-1(c)(2) (medical homes).
149. § 1395jjj.
150. Final Rule Creates Pathways to Success for the Medicare Shared Savings Program, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/factsheets/final-rule-creates-pathways-success-medicare-shared-savings-program.
151. Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations,
76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,824 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
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prevent, at least in the FFS world. 152 Indeed, a 2012 Government Accountability
Office (GAO) study concluded that from the perspective of many providers, the
challenges of implementing value-based incentive programs within the current
fraud laws outweighed the potential benefits. 153 In response, HHS developed a
process to waive the laws for ACOs if certain safeguards were present, including
authorization by a governing body, a bona fide determination that the
arrangement was reasonably related to the purposes of the program, and public
disclosure. 154
Those efforts were enshrined into law at the very end of the Trump
administration, which on November 20, 2020, finalized changes to the Stark,
Anti-Kickback, and Beneficiary Inducements regulations to permanently allow
certain value-based arrangements. 155 The new Stark exception for value-based
arrangements provides varying levels of flexibility depending on the level of
financial risk borne by the parties, ranging from full risk to “meaningful
downside financial risk” to no or low risk. 156 The Anti-Kickback regulations
include three new safe harbors addressing similar considerations, providing
greater flexibility for participants willing to take on greater financial risk. 157 All
three new safe harbors protect the exchange of in-kind remuneration, but
monetary remuneration is only protected for arrangements involving at least
“substantial downside financial risk.” 158 While the new Stark and AntiKickback exceptions are similar, due to inherent differences in the laws, the
regulations are not identical; therefore, providers cannot assume that meeting
the criteria under one statute will protect against violating the other. 159
152. Krause, supra note 140, at 854.
153. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-355, MEDICARE: IMPLEMENTATION OF
FINANCIAL INCENTIVE PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL FRAUD AND ABUSE LAWS 36–37 (Mar.
2012).
154. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. 66,726 (Oct. 29, 2015) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
155. Medicare Program; Modernizing and Clarifying the Physician Self-Referral Regulations,
85 Fed. Reg. 77,492 (Dec. 2, 2020) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411); Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil
Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,684 (Dec. 2, 2020)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001, 1003); Off. of Inspector Gen., Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil
Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,684, 77,684 (Dec.
2, 2020).
156. 42 C.F.R. § 411.357 (2021).
157. Off. of Inspector Gen., supra note 155.
158. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (ee), (ff) & (gg) (2021). The revisions also expanded the personal
services and management contracts safe harbor to permit certain “outcomes-based payment,”
§ 1001.952(d)(2) (2021), and created a new safe harbor for “[a]rrangements for patient engagement
and support to improve quality, health outcomes, and efficiency” for patients in value-based
arrangements. § 1001.952(hh) (2021).
159. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1320a‒7b(b), with 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn.
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Although the regulations finalized a process that began during the Obama
administration, the timing of the announcement created difficulties. Indeed, it
was unclear for several months whether the Biden administration intended to
revoke the provisions, as is common with last-minute regulations finalized at the
end of a predecessor’s administration. 160 The rules were announced on
November 20, 2020, with an effective date of January 19, 2021, just before
President Biden took office—but they were not published in the Federal Register
until December 2, 2020. 161 The Congressional Review Act requires a period of
sixty days to elapse between the effective date of a major rule and the rule’s
publication in the Federal Register or receipt by Congress. 162Although the
November 20 announcement would have met the sixty-day threshold, the delay
in publication until December 2 led GAO to conclude that the final rules were
not in technical compliance with the Act. 163 Moreover, President Biden’s Chief
of Staff issued a memorandum on Inauguration Day requesting that executive
agencies “consider postponing [several] rules’ effective dates for 60 days from
the date of this memorandum . . . for the purpose of reviewing any questions of
fact, law, and policy the rules may raise.” 164 In February 2021, however, an
industry publication quoted a CMS statement that the Stark revisions were in
fact in effect (with the exception of one provision that had a later effective date);
while OIG has not made a similar statement, the revised safe harbors currently
appear on the agency’s website. 165

160. Sharece Thrower, Regulatory Delay Across Administrations, BROOKINGS (July 10, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulatory-delay-across-administrations/.
161. Medicare Program: Modernizing and Clarifying the Physician Self-Referral Regulations,
85 Fed. Reg. 77,492, 77,492–682 (Dec. 2, 2020).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A).
163. Letter from Shirley A. Jones, Managing Associate Gen. Couns., GAO, to The Hon. Chuck
Grassley et. al., on Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services: Medicare Program; Modernizing and Clarifying the Physician Self-Referral Regulations
(Dec. 14, 2020) (on file at https://www.gao.gov/products/b-332770); Letter from Shirley A. Jones,
Managing Assoc. Gen. Couns., GAO, to The Honorable Chuck Grassley et al., on Department of
Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General: Medicare and State Health Care
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, and Civil
Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements (Dec. 22, 2020) (on file at
https://www.gao.gov/products/b-332788).
164. Memorandum from Ronald A. Klain, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies on Regul. Freeze Pending Rev. (Jan. 20, 2021).
165. Is the New CMS Rule That Impacts Healthcare Valuations Now at Risk?, BVR (Feb. 17,
2021), https://www.bvresources.com/articles/bvwire/is-the-new-cms-rule-that-impacts-healthcare
-valuations-now-at-risk (quoting statement from CMS); HHS Office of Inspector General Fact
Sheet, Final Rule: Revisions to the Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil
Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Nov. 2020), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/compliance/836/factsheet-rule-beneficiary-induce
ments.pdf.
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There is a difference, however, between removing obstacles to the creation
of innovative payment and delivery models, and a presumption that those
models—because they generally are expected to improve quality of care and
lower costs—will similarly reduce incentives for fraud. Above all, health care
fraud is opportunistic, flourishing in the dark recesses where reimbursement
meets reporting. 166 Under FFS, physicians may be tempted to “upcode” to more
lucrative categories of care or charge for services that were not provided, and
hospitals may be tempted to shift costs into categories that receive favorable
payment. 167 Payment mechanisms drive the way in which fraud will be
expressed in any particular reimbursement system. 168 Thus, experience suggests
that rather than reducing overall fraud, value-based reimbursement will simply
change the way in which fraud occurs.
Moreover, the Biden administration assumed office when this transition
from volume-to valued-based payment was incomplete. Every reimbursement
method contains incentives for providers to misrepresent something in order to
increase payment. 169 Under the MSSP, for example, ACOs prosper if they report
high quality of care and patient satisfaction in addition to lower costs. 170 Thus,
there may be incentives for ACOs to misrepresent costs, to report a more highlycompensated patient mix, to report better outcomes (or downgrade initial
assessments to make it appear patients have made progress), to cherry-pick the
patients who are asked to complete satisfaction surveys, or to surreptitiously
encourage riskier patients to opt out of the ACO altogether. 171 Moreover, as
initially created, the MSSP did not require ACO providers to be paid on a
bundled or even a value-enhanced basis; participants were paid under the
Medicare FFS program while also being eligible for shared savings, meaning
that the fraud incentives inherent in volume-based FFS payment were still
present. 172 In essence, then, President Biden must confront the worst of both
166. Tracey A. Elliott & Joan H. Krause, Introduction: Fraud and Abuse Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE HEALTH LAW 365, 365‒66 (Tamara Hervey & David Orentlicher,
eds., 2022) (describing how fraud is “universal, dynamic, and persistent”).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D.D.C. 1994) (alleged billing for
lengthier psychiatric treatment sessions than actually occurred); Largest Health Care Fraud Case
in U.S. History Settled: HCA Investigation Nets Record Total of $1.7 Billion, DEPT. JUST. (June 26,
2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/03_civ_386.htm (describing allegations
that hospital chain engaged in cost reporting fraud schemes).
168. See Pamela H. Bucy, Health Care Reform and Fraud by Health Care Providers, 38 VILL.
L. REV. 1003, 1049 (1993) (“In health care, like in everything else, the way we pay people affects
the way they cheat.”).
169. Id.
170. Jessica L. Mantel, Accountable Care Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It
Too?, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1393, 1412‒13 (2012).
171. See id. at 1425, 1427, 1432, 1434‒35 (describing risks of undertreatment and “upstaging”
of patient data).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(d)(a)(A).
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worlds: traditional forms of fraud in the lingering FFS system, plus new forms
of fraud unique to value-based payment.
C. Addressing Ongoing Fraud
Lest we forget, even amid a pandemic and an evolving health care
reimbursement system, traditional forms of fraud continue to flourish. The
Biden administration must contend not only with new forms of fraud, but also
with the types of fraudulent activities that have long bedeviled the government.
Fraud occurs in every corner of the health care industry: the 2020 HCFAC
Annual Report, for example, highlighted nearly twenty different areas of
enforcement, including ambulance services, durable medical equipment,
electronic health records, home health services, hospitals, laboratories, nursing
homes, physical and occupational therapy, prescription drugs, and substance
abuse treatment. 173 According to a 2012 GAO report, the majority (60.6%) of
civil investigations and almost half (49.2%) of criminal investigations focused
on entities such as hospitals, home health providers, and medical facilities;
physicians were the largest category of individual targets, comprising an
estimated 15.4% of criminal and 12.1% of civil investigations. 174
One area of ongoing fraud concern is the pharmaceutical industry. Between
1991 and 2017, pharmaceutical manufacturers entered into 412 fraud
settlements totaling $38.6 billion. 175 The average federal financial penalty
decreased significantly in 2016-2017 from a high in 2012-2013, with very few
federal criminal penalties assessed and qui tam complaints responsible for fiftyfour percent of federal settlements. 176 Common allegations against the industry
include the payment of kickbacks to physicians in return for prescribing a
company’s products, unlawful promotion, and Medicaid drug pricing fraud. 177
Indeed, nearly every aspect of drug research, development, and sales has
implicated fraud concerns, including not only improper activities designed to
increase the sales of a product once it is on the market, but even the legitimacy
of basic research studies. 178
173. See 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53, at 14–30.
174. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-820, TYPES OF PROVIDERS INVOLVED IN
MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND THE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM CASES 16–18, 25–
27 (2012).
175. Sammy Almashat et al., Twenty-Seven Years of Pharmaceutical Industry Criminal and
Civil Penalties: 1991 Through 2017, PUB. CITIZEN 4 (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.citizen.org/wpcontent/uploads/2408.pdf.
176. Id. at 10.
177. See generally id.
178. See, e.g., Kevin P. Hill et al., The Advantage Seeding Trial: A Review of Internal
Documents, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 251, 256 (2008) (describing “seeding trial” for
Vioxx, designed to “seed” the market under the guise of studying a legitimate scientific research
question); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature is Shaped
Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 4 PLOS MED., Sept. 2007, at 1429, 1429
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There is no sign that these concerns are waning. Based on data from Open
Payments, the publicly available database created by the Physician Payments
Sunshine Act, payments from manufacturers to physicians remain robust;
moreover, there is growing anecdotal evidence that such payments—even if not
designed as explicit kickbacks—are associated with physicians’ perhaps
unintentional increased use of particular products. 179 Indeed, recent
investigations indicate that the problem may be even more extensive in the
medical device industry, despite the majority of investigations traditionally
focusing on pharmaceutical manufacturers. 180 There also has been no shortage
of allegations that manufacturers continue to offer more explicit incentives for
physicians to use their products, including a November 2021 settlement with a
company accused of offering gifts to physicians to induce them to prescribe the
company’s opioid overdose antidote. 181
Another area of activity that continues to draw scrutiny is pharmaceutical
company funding of patient assistance programs, which are designed to help
patients defray the cost of expensive brand-name drugs. 182 When the companies
that manufacture those drugs also fund nominally “independent” assistance
programs, the government has warned of concerns that the companies are using
their donations to steer patients toward their own products in violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 183 The DOJ has entered into several settlements over this
practice, and is currently fighting a suit by Pfizer challenging the government’s
interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statute in this context. 184

(questioning studies that are “ghost-managed” by manufacturers and “ghost-written” by company
staff while research publicly is attributed to independent medical experts.).
179. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., What is Open Payments?, CMS.GOV,
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments (last modified Feb. 3, 2022, 8:30 AM); Kosuke Inoue et al.,
Association Between Industry Payments and Prescriptions of Long-Acting Insulin: An
Observational Study with Propensity Score Matching, PLOS MED., June 2021, at 1, 10; Amarnath
R. Annapureddy et al., Association Between Industry Payments to Physicians and Device Selection
in ICD Implantation, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1755, 1762 (2020); Deborah C. Marshall et al., Trends
in Industry Payments to Physicians in the United States from 2014 to 2018, 324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1785, 1785 (2020).
180. See Alon Bergman et al., Medical Device Firm Payments to Physicians Exceed What Drug
Companies Pay Physicians, Target Surgical Specialties, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 603, 604, 608 (2021).
181. Kaléo, Inc. Agrees to Pay $12.7 Million to Resolve Allegations of False Claims for AntiOverdose Drug, U.S. DEP’T. JUST. (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/kal-o-incagrees-pay-127-million-resolve-allegations-false-claims-anti-overdose-drug.
182. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin: Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare
Part D Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,625 (Nov. 22, 2005).
183. Id.
184. See Sheng Liu et al., Patient Assistance Programs for Prescription Drugs: Charities or
Kickbacks?, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. (July 31, 2021), https://www.americanhealthlaw.org/content
-library/journal-health-law/article/9b03b263-e910-48e4-847d-84c7a351ee23/patient-assistanceprograms-for-prescription-drugs (describing challenges); Pfizer Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Health &
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Another area that requires attention is the ongoing effort to use the fraud
laws, among other tools, to address the opioid epidemic. The DOJ created an
Opioid Fraud and Abuse Detection Unit in August 2017, designed to aggregate
data to identify health care practitioners with questionable opioid prescribing
practices. 185 The effort also created several dedicated assistant United States
attorney positions focusing exclusively on prescription opioid-related fraud,
working with other federal and state agencies to target health care providers who
may be furthering the epidemic. 186 These efforts are continuing, with new
indictments filed and no indication that the Biden administration intends to pull
back on the initiative. 187
Fraud enforcement is proceeding on other fronts as well. The government
continues to pursue entities who defraud Medicare and Medicaid, including
recently intervening in a qui tam suit filed against Kaiser Permanente for
submitting inaccurate diagnosis codes for patients in order to obtain additional
reimbursement under Medicare Advantage, Medicare’s managed care
program. 188 Moreover, President Biden may have to weigh in on an effort by
Senator Chuck Grassley—a major proponent of the FCA and critic of some of
the Trump administration’s efforts to scale back enforcement—to amend the
FCA to make it easier for the government to prove that a misrepresentation is
“material” and more difficult for the DOJ to arbitrarily dismiss qui tam
complaints. 189 The Biden administration does not appear to have taken a position
on the proposed changes, but should some future version of the bill advance to
a successful floor vote, that will become necessary.
Overall, it appears the Biden administration has attempted to balance the
need for protection against serious fraud schemes with the recognition that
enforcement depends as much on the industry’s willingness to comply as it does
on the resources Congress is willing to devote to the problem—and a recognition
that when it comes to fraud, simply issuing more threats may not always be the

Human Servs., No. 1:20 Civ. 04920 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (granting government’s motion to
dismiss).
185. 2017 HCFAC Rep., supra note 50, at 10.
186. 2020 HCFAC Rep., supra note 53, at 10.
187. See Monmouth County Doctor Charged with Accepting Bribes and Kickbacks from
Pharmaceutical Company in Exchange for Unlawfully Prescribing Fentanyl, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/monmouth-county-doctor-charged-acceptingbribes-and-kickbacks-pharmaceutical-company.
188. See Government Intervenes in False Claims Act Lawsuits Against Kaiser Permanente
Affiliates for Submitting Inaccurate Diagnosis Codes to the Medicare Advantage Program, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (July 30, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/government-intervenes-false-claimsact-lawsuits-against-kaiser-permanente-affiliates.
189. False Claims Amendments Act of 2021, S. 2428, 117th Cong. (2021) (as reported out of
Committee on the Judiciary with amendment, Nov. 16, 2021).
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answer. 190 President Biden has not been shy about creating new enforcement
initiatives where needed. In October, the DOJ launched the Civil Cyber-Crime
Initiative, a new effort to utilize the FCA “to pursue cybersecurity related fraud
by government contractors and grant recipients” focusing on deficient
cybersecurity protections, misrepresentation of cybersecurity practices, and
violations of duties to monitor and report breaches. 191 Yet the administration
also appears committed to streamlining the voluminous amount of programrelated information available to the health care industry, mounting an “OIG
Modernization Initiative” designed to assure the government is “producing
useful and timely resources that, among other things, advance the health care
industry’s voluntary compliance and help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.” 192
Although it is too soon to tell, the administration’s efforts so far appear to signal
a commitment to preventing fraud while also trying to assure a fair playing field
for the industry.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Biden administration must confront a health care fraud threat that is
complex and relentless. The pandemic gave health care providers not only the
funds needed to stay solvent, but also incentives to misappropriate those funds
for unintended purposes. 193 The transition from volume-to value-based payment
is incomplete, leaving gaps in which both new and old forms of fraud may
flourish. 194 Moreover, traditional forms of fraud in the pharmaceutical industry
and beyond show no signs of abating. 195
Although the administration initially remained relatively quiet regarding
fraud, seemingly content to continue initiatives started by President Trump, the
DOJ, OIG, and CMS have started to roll out new guidance and undertake new
efforts, such as the Cyber-Crime Initiative and the COVID-19 Fraud

190. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 19, at 210–13 (warning of the importance of an enforcement
approach that the provider community accepts as legitimate).
191. Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative,
U.S. DEP’T JUST., (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-omonaco-announces-new-civil-cyber-fraud-initiative.
192. OIG Modernization Initiative to Improve Its Publicly Available Resources – Request for
Information 86 Fed. Reg. 53,072, 53,072 (Sept. 24, 2021). As another example, the Biden
administration updated the protocol for providers to self-disclose fraud violations in exchange for
leniency. Off. Inspector Gen., Updated: OIG’s Health Care Fraud Self-Disclosure Protocol, U.S.
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 8, 2021), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/self-disclosureinfo/1006/Self-Disclosure-Protocol-2021.pdf.
193. See discussion, supra Section III.A.
194. See discussion, supra Section III.B.
195. See discussion, supra Section III.C.
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Enforcement Task Force. 196 In many ways, these efforts harken back to the
enforcement priorities of the Obama administration, reinvigorating the DOJ’s
focus on the role of individuals in corporate crime and signaling a potentially
less industry-friendly approach. 197 The exigencies of the pandemic, however,
are likely to constrain President Biden’s ability to stray far from the focus on
COVID-19, at least for the foreseeable future.

196. Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Monaco Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative,
supra note 191; Attorney General Announces Task Force to Combat COVID-19 Fraud, supra note
120.
197. See discussion, supra Section II.D.

